Recent evidence (e.g. Odean, 1998a) describes investor behavior that is at odds with traditional economic theory. These alternative behaviors, such as those consistent with the disposition effect or overconfidence, form the basis for recent "behavioral" explanations for asset returns (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998a , Odean 1998b , and Shumway, 1998. Notably, the evidence of alternative investor behavior is based largely on retail customer accounts -those of amateur traders.
Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that investors and experimental subjects exhibit behaviors that are somewhat at odds with the predictions of traditional economic and financial theory. For example, Odean (1998a and 1999) provides evidence that small investors trade "too much", and that while trading, they sell winners and hold losers. These results may be interpreted as supporting alternative behavioral theories, particularly prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . These striking results have been received passively, perhaps because retail investors (noise traders) are not expected to have much of an impact on market prices.
Perhaps such empirical evidence of alternative trading behaviors by small investors should not surprise us, since texts offering investors trading advice typically warn against exactly the type of trading documented by Odean. In an attempt to mitigate the potential investment harm caused by such behavior, the trading literature proposes "disciplined" approaches, through which investors lay out contingency plans. While such advice appears to be required for small investors, the conventional wisdom among professional traders suggests that "disciplined" trading is pervasive.
1 Based on their need for continuing success, the natural presumption should be that market professionals are disciplined traders who are less prone than retail investors to exhibit alternative and costly behavioral tendencies. If so, then behavioral problems may be an annoying but essentially harmless anomaly confined to some retail investors and experimental subjects. On the other hand, evidence that professional traders also exhibit alternative behavioral tendencies would provide increased support for research on the systemic effects of behavioral financial models, as, for example, in the model of Barberis, Schliefer and Vishny (1999) .
In this paper we study the trading behavior of professional futures traders, using high frequency analysis where trades are closed out in a matter of minutes. These traders depend on the profitability of their trading for income. Our findings reveal that these traders do consistently hold losing trades longer than winning trades. Further analysis shows that this does not appear to be a finding directly attributable to market-making techniques, such as the relative quick arrival of profitable offsetting customer orders. Despite the clear difference in the time to completion of winning and losing trades, we fail to find further costs associated with this behavior. Another view of these findings is that trades that are held longer are clearly less likely to be profitable, but once they are offset there is no further regret. Perhaps most redeeming is the finding that the more successful traders exhibit the appearance of loss aversion to a lesser degree: Relatively successful traders are less prone to sit on losing trades. The paper's structure is as follows. Section 2 reviews behavioral theories related to finance and some of the existing evidence. Section 3 describes the futures trading data and general methodology. In section 4 we present the results, and section 5 concludes.
Behavioral models: theory and existing evidence.
In this section we examine the extant evidence and theoretical research related to the relevant behavioral models. This section is not meant as a complete survey of the behavioral finance literature. Shiller (1997) provides an interesting overview of the literature up to 1997, focused on market efficiency.
Aberrant trading behavior must be measured against some acceptable benchmark. For instance, the second rule of trading could be termed "Cut your losses, ride your gains." (With the first rule being, of course, "Buy low, sell high.") However, recent evidence provided by Odean (1998a Odean ( , 1999 , Heisler (1996) , and Odean (2000a, 2000b) shows that small investors often ignore this well-known rule, and tend to hold losses longer than gains. What sort of behavioral model would result in investors holding losing trades for extended periods while cashing in winning trades early? Shefrin and Statman (1985) introduce the disposition effect, based on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , as an explanation for the perceived anecdotal evidence at that time of investor reluctance to realize losses. The disposition effect arises when investors focus on a reference point for their position from which gains and losses are calculated, rather than following a portfolio choice model. Agents are alleged to use a form of "frame reference" -evaluating opportunities to close existing positions as either gains or losses, measured against the reference point.
Prospect theory modifies expected utility theory in two areas, and leads to predictions that are consistent with investor loss realization aversion. First, investor utility is assumed to be a function of gains and losses relative to a benchmark, rather than a function of absolute wealth.
For example, Shumway (1997) finds that an assumed investor evaluation period of at least a year is required for the asymmetric predictions of prospect theory to be consistent with observed stock price movements over 1963-1995. Second, while standard utility functions are concave on both sides of a wealth point, prospect theory assumes utility functions that are concave for gains and convex for losses (but steeper so that overall risk aversion is attained). The prediction of a disposition effect relies on these two wrinkles to expected utility theory.
Early evidence supporting prospect theory is largely experimental (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) . The early experimental literature has been criticized for a lack of realism due to the absence of a monetary payoff. Other research looks at volume patterns for stocks conditioned upon prior price changes, including Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) . More recently, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) , Daniel, Hershleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998a, 1998b) , and Barberis, Huang and Santos (1999) have examined prospect theory in asset prices, in conjunction with the concept of the "house-money" effect. House-money is the issue of altering behavior upon realizing gains and losses, i.e., becoming less risk averse after realizing a gain. Fama (1998) points out that "observational" evidence is clearly subject to various, potentially conflicting, interpretations. Odean (1998a Odean ( , 1999 , Heisler (1996) , and Odean (2000a, 2000b) , look at direct evidence in the trading of small retail investors, or, in the case of Heisler, small offexchange retail speculators. These studies support the notion that these investors trade in a manner that is consistent with behavior predicted by prospect theory. That is, they hold their losing trades longer than their winning trades, and this leads to deteriorating profitability, according to the evidence in Odean (1998a) .
Data and Methodology

The trading pit environment
The futures trading pit which forms our data generation mechanism has been described in some detail. Kuserk and Locke (1993) in particular describe the high frequency trading of futures floor traders trading for their own account. Silber (1984) examines in detail several such traders. Mann (1996, 1999) delve further into inventory management and sources of profits for futures floor traders. Together, these papers find that a large group of floor traders trade frequently, making small but positive revenue per trade, on average, and rarely hold overnight positions. From this environment we seek evidence of behavioral problems among these floor traders.
The data
In this section we define the rich data set, and provide some general detail of the prices and volumes traded. We use transactions data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) graciously supplied by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. We use data from 1995 for the two most active currencies (Deutsche mark and Swiss franc) and the two most active nonfinancial commodities (Live cattle and Pork bellies). We use the first six months of data to document trader behavior, and the second six months to examine the relationship between measures of trader loss realization aversion for the first six months and subsequent trader success.
We select all traders that executed at least five trades for their personal account on at least ten different days during the 1995 calendar year, resulting in a sample of 334 traders. These traders were responsible for 99.54% of the personal account volume traded in these contracts during this period. The excluded traders are much more transient, or may even be entering and offsetting brokerage error trades. In addition to volatility statistics, Table 1 also provides statistics on income and volume for personal account traders included in the sample. Traders were selected using the full year sample. The fifth row reveals the number of selected traders that were present in the first and second six-month periods. Note that these traders are under no obligation to trade, and most may trade any commodity any time. There appears to be slightly fewer traders active in the second six-month period, across the four commodities. The highest number of traders is in the dmark contract, the fewest in bellies. 2 Row 8 reveals that traders make a small income per contract on a round trip basis, around 1 tick or less across all four commodities. Row 9 shows the aggregate income for the sample of floor traders. In a sense this is measure of the gross value added of the exchange. Rows 10,11 and 12 show the quartiles for mean daily incomes across traders. Clearly there is heterogeneity in terms of income across these trader groups, which we explore in detail later.
Trade histories and accounting
In this section we describe the method for determining a trader's history, and our accounting methodology. We construct trade sequences for each trader (and also for each different contract delivery month in which the trader executes personal account trades) for each trading day of the six-month sample period. The data provide trades sequenced to the minute.
For each minute of the trading day (for each contract) we determine the quantity of contracts that traders buy and sell. In addition we calculate certain market statistics by minute. We assume that all trades are closed out at the end of each day, so traders carry no overnight position (Kuserk and Locke 1993, and Mann 1996, present evidence that floor traders rarely hold overnight positions).
Sometimes multiple trades occur within a minute, which cannot be sequenced. If a trader buys contracts at two different prices during a minute, we consolidate the trades and use the quantity-weighted mean price as the trader's purchase price for the minute. We treat sales analogously so that for each minute, we track each trader's buy volume and mean purchase price as well as the trader's sell volume and mean sales price.
We develop a methodology for revenue and timing accounting. Trading language typically refers to how much was made or lost on 'a trade.' For a simple trade, in which something is purchased, then later sold (or vice versa), the trade is easy to define, as are any revenues associated with it. Floor trader histories typically exhibit much more complicated trade sequences. Therefore, average cost allows trades, and their associated revenues, to be defined without resorting to either specific identification accounting (attempts to match specific contract purchases with specific sales), or a LIFO/FIFO scheme. This method parallels Silber (1984) .
We employ analogous methods to calculate the length of time that positions are held. A complete description of this methodology, with a numerical example, is provided in Appendix 1.
The cost for each contract in a trader's position at the beginning and the end of each minute is defined as the quantity-weighted average price for the position. We use cost in a 2 Generally, traders are free to migrate among these and other CME pits, although Kuserk and positive mark-to-market indicates that at that time, the position could probably be closed for a gain; a negative mark-to-market indicates that the position could probably be closed at a loss.
In addition to a running mark-to-market, we count the minutes that a trader had the opportunity to complete a trade with an outcome similar to the eventual outcome, but did not.
For example, consider a trade that had been held for 20 minutes and was subsequently completed with a gain. If, over the 20 minutes that the position was held, the position was marked-tomarket at a gain for 12 minutes and a loss for 8 minutes, then for that trade we count 12 potential exit minutes. Thus each losing trade's potential exit minute statistic represents the number of prior opportunities to take a loss; potential exit minutes for gains represent the number of prior opportunities to take a gain. For trades that are offset within a minute, we treat potential exit minutes as undefined.
We also calculate for each trade the position size and mark-to-market for each of these potential exit minutes. For trades resulting in losses, we evaluate position size (number of contracts held) and the mark-to-market for only those minutes for which the mark-to-market is negative, with corresponding calculations for trades resulting in gains. Finally, for each trade, we calculate the average position and mark-to-market across those potential exit minutes to complement the simple count of potential exit opportunity minutes.
In sum, for every trade, we record the revenue, cost, holding time, the current mark of the trader's position, the count of potential exit minutes, and the average position and mark over those potential exit minutes. The revenue from a trade is the sale price or cost of the short position, minus the purchase price or cost of the long position. The sequence, buy first, sell later, or vice versa, is irrelevant to futures market accounting.
Empirical results.
Intra-minute trades
In this section we describe the characteristics of the subset of trades that were offset within a minute. Our goal is to make inferences about trader decision processes regarding existing positions. However, a cursory examination of the data revealed that traders frequently execute offsetting transactions (buys and sells) during a minute while leaving their position unchanged; sometimes traders change their positions while executing some intra-minute offsetting trades as well. The data do not allow a sequencing of these intra-minute trades, which makes some behavioral inferences from these trades problematic. 3 Because of this uncertainty, for our cost and time accounting described above we isolate these trades, imposing no changes to the holding times or average costs of existing positions. We do, however, include the trades in our analysis, and the revenue and holding time are calculated accordingly. The revenue for an intra-minute trade is the quantity traded times the difference in sales price minus purchase price.
The holding time for an intra-minute trade is zero. Because these trades are a significant fraction of all trades, we describe them in some detail relative to other trades. Table 2 provides summary statistics for these intra-minute trades compared to other trades in the January-to-June sample.
The results in inter-quartile range of per contract gains and losses is three to five times wider for trades held for a minute or longer than for the intraminute trades.
Differences in holding times for losses compared to gains
In this section we examine whether professional traders, as a group, exhibit "loss realization aversion," by comparing trader holding times for winning trades to their holding times for losing trades, using only the first six months of the data for the analysis. As a first pass, we compare holding times for gains versus losses, with no control for the relative magnitude of absolute revenues. However, insofar as the distribution of sizes of gains and losses may differ, these aggregate results may be misleading for our purposes. With that in mind, we examine the holding times in more detail by comparing gain and loss holding times for sub-samples selected on the basis of the absolute revenue per contract for the trade. The categories are for illustrative purposes, and the following break points are somewhat arbitrary, although we did seek a sufficient sample size in each category. The six categories are: 1) trades with zero revenue (no first went up to two, then down to one, or first went flat and then up to one. We do know at the end of the minute the trader is still up one.
gain or loss2) absolute revenue less than $10 per contract; 3) at least $10 but less than $25; 4) at least $25 but less than $50; 5) at least $50 but less than $100; and 6) any trades with absolute revenue of at least $100 per contract. Table 3 provides exceeds the percentage of large gains (11.8%). 5 Table 4 reports the results of holding time comparisons. Panel A reports comparisons without regard to absolute revenue magnitude, while Panel B compares gain and loss holding times for trades with similar absolute revenues. The median hold times range from three to twenty-three minutes across the four commodities. These numbers might appear somewhat high given the suggestion by Silber (1984) that holding a trade longer than 2 minutes would result in an expected loss. The difference could be due to the different time periods and different exchanges. However, our sample is much more comprehensive; we analyze entire trading populations over a six-month period, rather than selected individuals. Comparing gains to losses, the results are striking: professional traders as a group hold losses significantly longer than gains. Panel A shows that overall, losses are held substantially longer than gains for all four commodities. Median and average holding times for losses range from 35% to 133% longer than counterpart holding times for gains. The differences in times are most noticeable in the two agricultural commodities, and in particular in pork bellies.
As noted above, we were concerned that gains and losses might be treated differently depending on the size of the absolute revenue. We tested for differences in holding times by revenue magnitude using the revenue categories developed for table 3. These results are reported in Panel B of table 4, which provides overwhelming evidence that gains are realized more quickly than losses regardless of the magnitude of the absolute gain. For example, the median time for $10 to $25 pork bellies losses is 9 minutes, compared to about 2 minutes for the corresponding gains between $10 and $25. Similar differences exist across most categories, with some exceptions, such as the 1-minute median times for gains and losses for francs and dmarks in the $10-$25 range. However, across all revenue categories, losses are held significantly longer than gains. Clearly, the professional traders in our sample appear to exhibit the characteristics of loss realization aversion as a group -in that they hold losing trades longer than winning trades.
However, evidence that losses are held longer than gains, while consistent with loss realization aversion, is subject to alternative explanations consistent with entirely rational activity. Traders have no affirmative obligation to trade, and therefore are likely to enter positions only when they have an expectation that the price will move in their favor. Since futures floor traders have positive trading revenues, on average (Kuserk & Locke, 1993) , their expectations are rational in that they are correct, on average. The expectation could be driven by a pure market-making technique, with revenue generated from the bid-ask bounce, or could derive from an informational advantage such as the advantage of being on the floor and observing the order flow, as described by Manaster and Mann (1999) .
Either of these suggestions may mean that traders will be facing an opportunity to realize gains more rapidly, on average, than losses. Consider a market maker buying at the bid, which he expects to be less than the current intrinsic value, borrowing a term from traditional microstructure literature. A market maker bids in rational anticipation of receiving subsequent offers to buy, so that he can sell at the ask. This should happen relatively soon, and more frequently than other outcomes, if the trader is successful on average. Less often, the market maker will scratch the trade, earning zero income, or, worse, there could be an adverse information effect (or, the market maker erred), and the market maker may find it in his or her best interest to sell at a price lower than the buy price, losing money on the trade. This last type of event may take longer to develop on average relative to the successful bid-ask bounce (scalping) trades. In other words, the results in Table 4 may indicate that losses are held longer only because the successful market making technique implies that a gain occurs more rapidly than the opportunity for a loss. For convenience we label this alternative explanation of differential holding times the "differential opportunity" explanation.
We examine the differential opportunity explanation by following the history of a tradespecifically identifying the opportunities to realize a loss or gain prior to the actual realization of a loss or gain for each trade. For each trade we calculate the potential exit minutes -the number of opportunities to realize a gain (loss) prior to actually realizing a gain (loss) (see section 3.2 for a more complete explanation). For this analysis, the potential minutes for trades that are offset within a minute are undefined. If traders hold losses longer than gains only because gain opportunities occur more rapidly than loss opportunities, then we would expect average potential exit minutes for gains and losses to be the same. On the other hand, if the evidence shows that traders pass up more opportunities to take a loss, on average, than they do for gains, then this would not support the differential opportunity explanation, leaving loss realization aversion as a plausible explanation. Table 5 provides results of tests for differences between prior opportunities to exit trades at gains versus losses by reporting mean and median potential exit minutes for gains compared with losses. The results clearly show that traders, on average, pass up more opportunities to exit losing trades at a loss than they do winning trades at a gain. The first two columns of Table 5 report mean and median potential exit minutes for gains and losses. For all four pits, trades that eventually result in a loss are preceded by significantly more prior opportunities to realize that loss than similar gainful opportunities for their counterpart winning trades. Opportunities for offsetting losses preceding trades that realized losses are again significantly higher than the comparable measure for gains.
The simple counting measure for opportunities reported above may be misleading if there are differences in the rate at which losses or gains accrue. We calculate, for same sign exit possibility minutes over the history of the trade, the average and median position, and the average and median mark-to-market value of the position. These are reported in columns 4 through 7 of table 5. For example, losses being held by dmark traders have an average position size of 13.5 contracts, compared to 11.4 contracts while holding gains. Similarly, for the franc, the average value of the position preceding a loss is negative $1800, while the average value of a position preceding a gain is positive $1187, and the absolute values are significantly different.
In fact, in each case (position size and value of potential gain or loss) across the four commodities, trades that resulted in a loss exhibit greater exposure. Traders hold on to losses with significantly greater position sizes and significantly greater absolute mark-to-market than for the gains that they hold. In summary, these results show that traders pass up more opportunities to realize losses than gains, hold larger positions while holding losses, and are exposed to bigger losses than potential gains.
We have established that these traders take significantly longer to realize their losses than their gains. Predictions based on market making behavior, which could be consistent with this result, are not validated with additional statistics based on trade histories. Nonetheless, we have not established that loss realization aversion for these traders has negative consequences. Odean (1998a) documents negative consequences for equity investors associated with the timing element of the choice to sell -in that the winning stocks that are sold subsequently outperform losing stocks that are retained. He also alludes to benefits from momentum-based trading which may be diluted by the disposition effect. In the remainder of the paper we seek measures identifying similar costs associated with loss realization aversion for these futures traders.
Comparing "trade quality" for position-closing trades with gains versus losses.
In this section we examine the quality of the decision to close out a trade. The extra holding time associated with losing trades established above does not imply inferior trade quality for those trades, especially on an intra-day trade. In other words, our finding of a longer holding time for trades that result in losses may simply be the discovery of a benign characteristic of trader behavior. Similar to Odean (1998a) we identify certain post-trade measures of the quality of the decision to terminate a trade. We examine trade quality by defining several measures of post-trade potential revenues and one measure of pre-trade potential and comparing these quality measures for trades that resulted in gains versus those that resulted in losses.
The forward-looking measures compare prices obtained for position-reducing trades to three alternative subsequent potential exit prices. We term these "what if" profits foregone income. For positions reduced by selling, foregone income is defined as the benchmark potential exit price less the actual sale price. For position reductions via purchase (i.e. covering a short position) foregone income is defined as the purchase price less the benchmark price. Thus, for both purchases and sales, foregone income measures the dollars that were "lost" by trading at that time rather than at some particular later price. Positive foregone income indicates that the position-reducing trade was -in effect -poorly timed (looking forward to the alternate benchmark). On the other hand, negative or zero foregone income indicates that the trade was, ex post, well timed
The three forward-looking potential exit price benchmarks implicitly embed various assumptions about the ability of the traders to time their trades. The first measure looks forward 10-minutes to examine the quality of the trade vis-à-vis an estimate of contract value shortly after the close of the trade. For this we use the average pit price in the 10 th minute after the completion of a trade, which may be viewed as an unbiased predictor of the intrinsic value of the contract at the time that the trader offsets their position. The second measure uses the more standard closing price for the day. These two measures define the same benchmark price for purchases and sales. Thus, if a trader closes a position by selling at 'the ask' or buying at 'the bid' then we would expect negative foregone revenues versus the 10-minute ahead price or the closing price, which serve as proxies for the contemporaneous intrinsic value. We employ multiple benchmarks to allow for the possibility that trader compensation for liquidity provision accrues from longer-term liquidity swings, in addition to the higher frequency bid-ask bounce.
For an elaboration on this distinction, see Manaster and Mann (1999) . Finally, we use a perfect foresight benchmark; looking forward from the time the trade is offset to the end of the day, and searching for the best subsequent price (highest price for offsets by sales, lowest for offsets by In contrast to the striking difference between holding times for gains and losses, the foregone measures exhibit no systematically significant variation between gains and losses.
There is slightly stronger evidence that traders realize a higher percentage of their possible gains than they do their losses, but the overall message of the comparisons of trade quality is ambiguous. The evidence does not suggest that the current mark-to-market of a trade (whether it is a gain or a loss) influences the quality of the decision to close the trade. However, recall that, on average, losing trades are held longer.
Trader success and loss realization aversion
In this section, we develop an alternative method to assess the importance of loss realization aversion, by examining the relationship between measures of loss realization and trader relative success. The previous section provides substantial evidence that these professional traders as a group exhibit loss realization aversion. Combined with prior research findings that retail investors are reluctant to realize losses (Odean 1998a , Heisler 1996 , the results suggest that the disposition effect is a widespread phenomenon. However, in contrast to the findings of Odean (1998a) , the prior section's results provide no evidence that loss realization aversion is associated with negative financial consequences. Traders hold losing trades longer than winning trades, but the relative amount won or lost on the trade appears to be driven by the trade initiation, rather than the timing of the trade offset. Odean (1998a) attributes negative consequences of the disposition effect to the consequences of price momentum that are presumably more noticeable in individual equities than for commodity futures prices. If negative consequences are due only to momentum effects, then trader loss realization may be harmless on average in the absence of momentum.
However, regardless of the role of momentum, the results presented in section 4.2 aggregate all traders, and the floor trading population is not a homogenous group. Traders vary by experience, capitalization, and trading strategies. If conventional wisdom about trading has validity, then successful traders presumably have more discipline than their less successful peers, where discipline is taken to mean minimization of alternative and potentially costly behavioral tendencies such as loss realization aversion. In the rest of the paper we examine the relationship between success and loss realization aversion.
Defining success
To determine whether success is related to discipline, we first tackle the problem of formulating a working definition of success. Intuitively, trading revenue ought to be directly related to trading success. However, the amount of risk undertaken in order to achieve shortterm revenue is certainly vital to long-run survival. To accommodate this sampling problem, we utilize two related measures of success. The first measure is total income for the six-month sample period. The second measure, which we label "risk-adjusted performance", or RAP, measures a trader's daily "return" on a measure related to the economic capital required by traders to cover potential losses undertaken in order to trade the position. The RAP measure gives low rankings to traders who may have been successful in terms of income, but exposed themselves to relatively higher risk in the process of generating the income.
We estimate a measure related to a trader's economically required capital by considering the trader's marked-to-market position for each minute of each day that the trader trades. We define the maximum exposure for each trader each day as the absolute value of the trader's maximum loss exposure (negative mark-to-market) each day. In some cases this may be the largest loss taken by a trader, but more generally will represent the largest potential loss. We define an ex post value at risk (VaR) measure as the 95th percentile daily maximum exposure for the trader. If a trader trades for one hundred days, we take the trader's fifth largest potential loss over the hundred days as the ex post VaR.
Given our VaR estimates related to trading capital requirements, we define the RAP as the average daily income divided by the VaR. Table 7 reports distributional statistics for RAP rankings. From this table, it is clear that traders with similar average trading incomes vary widely in the amount of risk they take in order to earn the income. The first two columns report median incomes and median 95th percentile potential losses for the traders within each quartile.
The median trader in the highest RAP-ranked quartile for the Deutsche mark earned a daily average of $1,101, and the 95th percentile potential loss for traders in the highest ranked Deutsche mark group was $3,398. The last column of Table 7 provides the RAP for the median trader within each group. The median trader in the highest-ranked Deutsche mark group has an RAP of 0.359.
A natural interpretation of the RAP ratio is the relationship of income to potential loss.
In this sense, traders with a RAP of 0.20 risk at least 5 times their average daily trading income around once every 20 days. From this table it appears that lower-ranked traders expose themselves to much more risk for a given level of income. For example, the median traders in the second-and third-ranked Deutsche mark groups have RAPs of 0.142 and 0.058, respectively, which indicates that these traders risk about seven times and seventeen times respectively, their mean daily income every twenty days.
Success and the disposition effect
Having described our trader sample's heterogeneity with respect to risk and income, in this subsection we assess the impact of trader behavior on success. We examine the relationship between success and the disposition effect using contemporaneous measures, and then investigate whether proxies for relative loss realization aversion have predictive power for subsequent success. Conventional wisdom (e.g. "cut your losses") suggests that more successful traders exhibit more "discipline", where discipline indicates the ability to exit losing positions relatively quickly. In fact, discipline is the term employed by successful traders, or their managers, as we reported in footnote 1. In other words, we are using the term "discipline," to indicate a relative avoidance of the disposition effect. We investigate success and discipline by comparing the profitability of trades for various holding times across trader success groupings.
We examine trade profitability across these various holding times because loss realization aversion, or the disposition effect, implies declining profitability as holding time increases. The disposition effect predicts that, all else being equal, gains are realized sooner than losses, so that as trade holding time increases, the proportion of losses should increase as well. If a subset of traders are more prone to the disposition effect, then the profitability of their trades should decline relative to other traders who are less prone to such behavior as holding times increase. Table 8 and the figures show, profitability remains relatively constant across holding times for higher ranked traders, in marked contrast to the lowest ranked traders.
For example, the lowest RAP quartile for Dmark traders earns $8.63 per contract on average for trades held less than 1-minute, but lose $11.52 on average for trades held longer than 10 minutes.
In contrast, Deutsche mark traders in the highest RAP quartile have comparable revenue per contract of $8.44 and a positive $14.87 respectively.
These results are perhaps clearest in figures 1 and 2. The lowest ranked traders earn revenues comparable to their more successful peers for holding times up to 10 minutes. But trades held longer than 10 minute are especially unprofitable for less successful traders. If relative discipline is defined as the relative absence of loss realization aversion, or a relative propensity to quickly take losses, then the evidence in this section is consistent with the notion that relative discipline is related to success. The least successful traders seem particularly prone to the disposition effect.
The relationship between holding time profitability and simultaneous success is subject to a bias, since profitability is a component of both measures. In other words, all else being equal, low-income traders are more likely to earn less on their trades. In particular, the simultaneous relationship between success and holding time profitability is most evident for trades held a long time, which may simply indicate that trades must be held a long time in order to lose a lot. If so, then it is not surprising that when we look at loss distributions across trader relative success, we find large losses on long-held trades by lower ranked traders.
To address the simultaneity problem, we develop proxies for relative loss realization aversion and examine the relationship between the proxies for relative loss realization aversion and subsequent trading success. We use several proxies for evidence of relative loss realization aversion, and two measures of relative success. The data set is expanded to include the second six-month period for our success measurements, after establishing relative loss realization aversion in the first six-month period.
Measures of relative loss realization aversion
Traders with higher aversion to realizing losses should exhibit longer holding times for both losses and gains, all else equal, since some proportion of realized gains represent losses held until they became gains. Therefore, as one set of proxies for relative loss realization aversion, we use trader mean and median holding times for trades in the first six months of 1995. For each trader, we calculate holding times for each trade the trader completed from January through June 1995, then calculate mean and median holding times for that trader.
For the other set of proxies, we use each trader's mean and median potential loss exposure for trades held more than ten minutes during the first six months of the sample. For each trader, we collect all completed trades held more than ten minutes, along with the minuteby-minute mark-to-market history for each trade. We define the loss exposure for each trade as the absolute value of the most negative mark-to-market gain (the largest potential loss) per contract during the trade history.
Given proxy measures for relative loss realization aversion, we examine the relationship between relative loss realization aversion, or discipline, and subsequent success via correlation and tabulation. Table 9 provides correlations between the first-period discipline measures and subsequent success. The table provides ordinary (Pearson) and rank (Spearman) correlations between first period holding times and the two measures of subsequent success defined above.
The significance of the correlations versus a null hypothesis of no correlation is measured by the p-values that are presented in italics below each correlation. Table 9 shows that first period trade holding times are negatively correlated with subsequent success. Using the two correlation measures, two loss aversion measures, and four commodities provides 16 correlations, all of which are negative and significant in the case of RAP. Correlations between first period holding times and subsequent gross income are of mixed sign, with 7 negative and 9 positive, and with low significance levels. The results indicate that higher relative loss realization aversion in the first period is associated with lower subsequent success, particularly as measured by return on economically required capital, or RAP. Table 9 also provides correlations between our measure of potential loss exposures and subsequent success, in the final two columns. Traders that exposed themselves to larger potential losses per contract on average in the first period appear to have lower subsequent success. All 16 correlations between first period exposure and subsequent RAP are negative, and 12 of these have significance levels less than 10%. Consistent with the hold time measure, correlations between exposure and subsequent income are less conclusive. While 11 of the correlations are negative, 4 are significant at the 10% level, and two are positive and significant.
To supplement the correlations, we also examine the success/disposition relationship in tabular format. We rank traders into quartiles on the basis of first-period relative loss realization aversion, and then examine measures of subsequent success across the relative aversion quartiles. VaR here is the potential loss in the subsequent period (second six months), measured again by focusing on negative mark-to-markets. The strong positive relationship between first-period exposure and subsequent VaR, combined with the weak negative relationship between firstperiod exposure and subsequent income, leads to a negative relationship between first-period loss exposure and subsequent RAP. Table 11 provides mean and median second-period success statistics for traders within each first-period aversion quartile, where relative discipline is measured using median trade holding time. Traders most averse to realizing losses (those with the longest median holding times) generally have lower subsequent incomes, higher subsequent risk exposure (VaR) and lower subsequent RAP than do traders with more discipline, or lower relative loss realization aversion.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that professional futures floor traders appear to be subject to the disposition effect. These traders as a group hold losing trades longer on average than gains. As previous research documenting loss realization aversion focuses on small retail customers and experimental subjects, these findings -that professional traders, whose livelihood depends on their success, also exhibit the disposition effect -provide evidence that behavioral attributes are pervasive in the population. On one hand, this could be reassuring, in the sense that professional traders are really no different than the rest of us. On the other hand, the finding may be somewhat troubling, in the sense that these behaviors may affect asset pricing through market microstructure.
Examination of differences in trading activity and subsequent trader success shows that the least successful traders appear to exhibit most strongly the characteristics described as less disciplined. Specifically, while traders at every success level on average hold losses longer than gains, the least successful traders hold losses the longest while the most successful traders hold losses for the shortest time. Thus there is evidence that trading success is negatively related to the degree of loss realization aversion.
Appendix 1. Accounting Methodology
In order to provide an example of the accounting methodology, we provide Chart 1, an example of a trade history for an imaginary trader, Trader Z. Focusing on the first 5 columns of chart 1, Trader Z opens a position at 9:00 by buying a contract at $100; the end-of-minute average cost of the position is $100. In each of the next two minutes Z adds to the position, buying one contract each minute at declining prices. The average per contract cost declines with each trade building the position: after 9:12 (the third minute), the average cost is $99.00, which is the average price of the three purchased contracts (the price of each trade weighted by trade quantity). Continuing with the example, as Trader Z liquidates the position by selling, the average cost of the remaining position is unchanged until 9:18, when the trader "switches" positions, moving from long (positive) to short (negative). At that point, the end-of-minute average cost is adjusted to the average sale price of the new short position, $102.
Chart 1 illustrates intraminute trades in minutes 9:13 and 9:19. At 9:13, Z buys 1 at $96
and sells 1 at $97. Z starts the minute long three contracts and ends the minute long three contracts. For these accounting purposes, we consider the intraminute trades as distinct trades We calculate realized revenues as the sale price less the purchase price times the number of round trips. The term 'round trips' means the number of contracts in a 'completed trade'.
In the example, the 9:13 intraminute offsets result in realized revenue of 1 (97 less 96) for one round trip. For position reductions (absolute), we calculate realized revenues as the difference between the trade price when the offset occurs and the average cost of that trade, multiplied by the number of round trips. Trader Z generates a loss of $3 and single round trip at 9:14 and a gain of $3 ($1.5 per contract) on 2 round trips at 9:20, with both of these trades being position reductions, one via sale at 9:14 and one via purchase at 9:20.
Chart 1 also illustrates our treatment of time. An example of the holding time calculation can be seen by focusing on columns 6 and 7. At the end of minute 9:11, trader Z has a long position of two contracts, one that was purchased at 9:11, one purchased at 9:10. The first contract has been held one minute and the second has just been purchased, so that the mean contract holding time is 0.5 minutes. As Trader Z sells to reduce the (absolute) position (beginning at 9:14), the hold time continues to increase, since position reductions do not affect the time that the remaining position has been held.
Chart 1 also illustrates the marking-to-market technique. At 9:15, trader Z has a long position of two contracts with a cost basis of $99.00. The 9:15 average pit price is $93.00, so Z's unrealized loss is $6.00 per contract, and the end-of-minute position mark-to-market for the two contracts is a $12.00 unrealized loss. Position marks are indicative of unrealized revenues at a point in time; rapid price changes can lead to observed unrealized losses becoming realized gains, and unrealized gains can become realized losses. The chart 1 example shows that trader Z enters the minute 9:17 with an unrealized loss on the long position, but rapid increase in the pit price allows Z to liquidate some of the position at a gain. t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time (minutes) highest income above median below median lowest income t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time (minutes) highest income above median below median lowest income t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time ( t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time ( t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time ( t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time ( t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time ( t < 1 1 < t < 2 2 < t < 3 3 < t < 5 5 < t < 10 10 < t holding time (minutes) highest RAP above median below median lowest RAP Note: Intra-minute trades are those round trips where the puchase and sale occur in the same minute, with unknown sequence; the quantity of intra-minute round trips is the minimum of the quantity bought and the quantity sold during a minute. If there are only purchases or sales but not both within a minute, then there are no intra-minute trades for that minute. Trades in the 'others' category are round trip transactions (contracts bought and sold) where the position is held at least one minute. Note: The table reports trade holding times. The holding time for a position increases by one minute at the start of each minute. As a trader adds to a position, the average hold time for each contract in the position is reduced to reflect the shorter holding time of the newest contracts. As positions are reduced but not eliminated, the hold time of the remaining position increases since additional time has passed. Intraminute trades have a hold time of zero, and do not change the average holding times of previously existing positions. .0 Note: The table provides statistics comparing intra-trade activity for winning versus losing trades. All trades held at least one minute that resulted in a gain or a loss are included (intra-minute trades and trades with zero profit are excluded). The first set of statistcis report the mean and median number of prior opportunities to exit trades with the same result as the eventual result (i.e., a gain or a loss). The second set of statistics report mean and median position sizes during those potential opportunities to exit the trade with the same result. Finally, the last set of results provide the mean and median maximum mark-to-market (negative for losses, positive for gain, in absolute value) during those potential opportunities to exit the trade at a loss or gain, respectively. 9.60 Note: Foregone revenue represents potential regret on the part of the trader. For example, when a trader buys to offset an existing short position, if the benchmark price is lower than the price of the offset, the trader "forgoes" the opportunity to offset the trade at the lower price. A negative value for foregone indicates the trader offset the trade at a price better than the benchmark. We report foregone income using three alternative benchmark prices: the closing price of the day, the market price 10 minutes after the trade, and a "perfect foresight" price, which is the best possible price that could have been obtained subsequent to the trade on the same day. Percentage of revenue realized is a measure of how well the trader could have done if they had gotten out earlier. If they close out at the peak, the percent realized is 100. If they make zero on a trade then the percent realized is 0, unless the trade was never in the money. For negative revenue trades, the opposite is calculated; e.g. was the trade executed at a better price than the worst mark. If a losing trade is closed out at the bottom, the percent realized is 100. Note: RAP is trader mean daily income divided by the trader's 95th percentile potential loss. The 95th percentile potential loss is found by finding the largest negative marking to market on each day the trader traded in the sample. Then the 95th percentile of the distribution of these daily statistics is the 95th percentile potential loss. Note: the table reports correlations between proxies for loss realization aversion during the first six months, and success measures for the second six months, for the traders active during both six-month periods.
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